Matthew J. Walton
In February of 1947, General Aung San, the young military leader who was quickly becoming the hero of the Burmese independence movement, met with leaders of the various ethnic minorities of Burma in the Shan town of Panglong to discuss their status within a soon-to-be independent Burma. At this time Aung San was also engaged in negotiations with the British, who were reluctant to allow the frontier regions—where the minority people lived—to gain independence at the same time as the rest of Burma. The British were sowing seeds of dissent among the minority people, in an effort to thwart Aung San’s goal of uniting all of the people of Burma.
Fortunately, the minority people trusted Aung San, listened to his proposal, and agreed that all the peoples of Burma should be treated equally, with all achieving independence at the same time. They demonstrated their support for a unified Burma by signing the Panglong Agreement on February 12, 1947, thus paving the way for the Constitution with which the Union of Burma was founded. February 12 was designated as Union Day, a celebration of the coming together of all the peoples of Burma, and a reminder to remember and preserve the spirit of Panglong.
The story above is, in some crucial respects, a fabrication, or at least a partial version of the truth. It is a standard narration (found in even elementary Burmese texts) of the conference held in 1947 in the town of Panglong that brought together leaders of various ethnic minority groups and leaders of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (Burma’s dominant political party at the time) to discuss the form in which the ethnic minority regions would be associated with a future independent Burma. In this paper I will investigate the effects of the Panglong agreement on Burma’s ethnic minority groups and argue that an understanding of ethnicity and the prospects for ethnic unity in Burma can be best achieved by a thorough examination of the ‘myths’ of Panglong.
Introduction
While some studies reach back to the earliest of the Burmese kings to examine the impact of ethnicity on the Burmese nation (see, for example, Tin Maung Maung Than 2004), I believe that the most effective place to begin discussions of national unity is in the event of the modern period that (despite its shortcomings) remains the most salient example of the possibility of ethnic unity—the Panglong Conference. In a 1989 article, Shan writer Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe calls for “scholars and students to dissect the myths surrounding the political history of Burma.” (1989, 101) Panglong has impacted Burmese politics through its potential, its failures, and the various perceptions of it held by opposing groups, therefore, it is an appropriate topic for such ‘dissection.’
My concern in this paper is not with specific proposals for democratic governance in Burma that deal with ethnic identity and representational arrangements. (see, for example, the federal constitution proposed by the Ethnic Nationalities Council 2006) Instead I wish to explore the impact that participation in or exclusion from the Panglong Conference had on various ethnic groups, and by extension, to highlight the vital place that a critical examination of Panglong must play in discussions of national unity in Burma. In this regard I disagree with Robert Taylor’s frequently quoted remark that “ethnic politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity in modern Burma.” (Taylor 1982, PAGE NUMBER?) An understanding of the relationship between ethnic identity and national identity (particularly when the two are not necessarily one and the same) is absolutely necessary in identifying why national unity remains an elusive concept in multi-ethnic nations like Burma. This relationship can be effectively understood by studying the dominant myths in a given society and determining the points at which they fail to resonate with certain groups and individuals.
Organization
I will begin with a brief theoretical discussion of ethnicity, nationalism, and the role of myths and memory in nation-building. It is through this lens that Panglong assumes a position of primary importance in the discussion of the prospects for national unity in Burma. Next, I provide a brief history of Burma since the colonial era, highlighting events that were significant in the creation or perpetuation of inter-ethnic tensions. I then present a short overview of the events surrounding the Panglong Conference before turning to a more detailed examination of the roles of various ethnic minorities at Panglong and the ways in which the Agreement affected their perceptions of the event and subsequent rebellions. Finally, I look at three different versions of the ‘myth of Panglong,’ pointing out limitations of each and suggesting some ways in which a reappraisal of Panglong could provide a vehicle for more effective discussions of national unity in Burma.
Ethnicity, Nation, and Myth
The very notion of ethnicity remains a contested topic within the social sciences. While recognizing that ethnic groups do not necessarily retain a constant, stable culture over time, scholars such as Clifford Geertz explored the contemporary salience of the primordial attachments and characteristics that are constitutive of ethnicity. (Geertz 1963) More recent perspectives have demonstrated the utility in understanding ethnicity as a relational concept, not built on specific, permanent cultural traits but rather constructed and changed over time as a result of interactions with different groups and individuals. Furthermore, Charles Keyes has pointed out that ethnicity becomes salient in the modern world when politics coincides with cultural differences, particularly when articulated with reference to a national ideology. (Keyes 1996) Key to understanding ethnicity then, are cultural differences that are identified through repeated interactions and gradually perceived as politically important. This is the point at which a discussion of nationalism and its founding myths becomes relevant for ethnic identity and conflict.
Each group within a nation needs to be able to identify with cultural symbolism and ideology. Thus, a prerequisite for national unity is understood to be the acceptance of common history and myths. While these common beginnings are often at least partially constructed, their resonance with the identities of individuals and groups is crucial in determining to what degree the national identity will be accepted and internalized. (Hobsbawm 1994) Anthony Smith cites the importance of collective history in nation-building, particularly the indirect influence of “myths and symbols of community” that it invokes. (1986, 200) History both defines the national unit and directs that unit towards a goal. Although this means that historical events are frequently ‘altered’ in order to be more effectively used for nationalist purposes, a dominant version persists and guides the people of the nation towards their collective goal, reminding them of their shared future via their common past. Myth is thus a necessary component of the nation, something that tells us who we are and where we are going.
An opposing idea of the role of myths in the lives of citizens is expressed by the political theorist Isaiah Berlin who notes, “To be ruled by myths…is a form of heteronomy, of being dominated by outside factors in a direction not necessarily willed by the agent.” (1969, 142) Despite the fact that expressions and campaigns of nationalism have rarely followed the guidelines laid out by liberal political theory, it is important to acknowledge the way in which myth limits the autonomy of both groups and individuals. If myths are necessary to the development of nations, they also constrain the development of individuals and groups within those nations, particularly when national myths conflict with local histories and perceptions of identity. In addition, when history is ‘altered’ in the service of national myth, it creates the possibility for dissonance and conflict with other aspects of identity, particularly ethnicity. This second possibility is particularly relevant with regard to the usage of national myths as a source of national unity in Burma.
Maurice Halbwachs built on the theories of Emile Durkheim to demonstrate how collective memory, far from being a given, is actually a constructed concept. (1992) Our past is continually reshaped as we see it differently based on our present needs or understandings. This can have an integrating purpose, helping to foster the common recollections that serve as the basis for a community or a nation, but in the process collective memory is often used as an oppressive tool to legitimize dominant state power, or at least to legitimize the position of a particular group. The dominant myth of Panglong presents an example of how collective memory can be manipulated to promote an official version of history. But the analysis of conflicting versions of this myth undermines the hegemony of the dominant myth and creates the possibility for contestation and inclusion. These processes will be examined in more detail at the end of the paper.
Colonization and Burma’s Struggle for Independence
Burma Under British Rule
The British conquered Burma in stages, beginning in 1824 and finally ousting the Burman King Thibaw in 1886. They sought to control the territory through a combination of both direct and indirect rule, relying on imported Indian officials in the central region and administering through traditional leaders in the outlying areas. In certain respects this method mimicked the governing structure that had been in place under previous Burmese kings, which Tambiah refers to as the “galactic polity.” (1976) The result of this policy was the official division of the colony into ‘Ministerial Burma’ (the central area, controlled from Rangoon) and the ‘Frontier Areas’ (the Shan States and the areas primarily inhabited by the Chin and Kachin). At this time, the Karenni State was officially considered to be an independent territory, although it was subordinate to the British in certain respects. (Union of Burma 1999) The administrative division between these two areas significantly affected the relationships that inhabitants of the areas subsequently developed with the British and determined in large part how the negotiations at Panglong were conducted and how independence was achieved.
While it is true that Burma’s struggle for independence was marked by divisions that existed long before the British began their colonial rule, these conflicts were no doubt exacerbated not only by British territorial divisions, but by colonial military recruitment policies as well. Although Martin Smith notes that “many important details of Burma’s ethnic past are still conjecture,” it is known that throughout the pre-colonial period there were frequent wars between nominally independent kingdoms in the area that would eventually be consolidated by the British. (1999, 33) Even as it was resisting the piecemeal annexation being conducted by the British, the Burman kingdom of Ava was also fighting a war from 1844-46 with the Karen that utilized levies of ethnic Shan soldiers. (Wilson 1981) It was British geographical divisions and colonial policies, however, which would solidify ethnic identity and have the greatest effect on the negotiations at Panglong and future ethnic relations in Burma.
After annexation, the British gradually began a process of exclusion of ethnic Burmans from the armed forces. The privileging of Chin, Kachin, and particularly Karen soldiers would have severely deleterious effects on the prospects for ethnic integration in the military after independence. In the eyes of the Burmans, ethnic minorities came to be associated with colonial rule. (Smith 1999) This perception was only exacerbated by the fact that predominantly Karen troops were used in the bloody suppression of Burmans in the Saya San rebellion of the 1930s. Andrew Selth points out that, before World War II, the British viewed the Burmese military primarily as a tool to maintain internal security. (2002) Consequently, the Burman majority saw it as an instrument to facilitate their oppression at the hands of ethnic minorities, particularly with the formalizing in 1925 of a policy of recruitment only of Chins, Kachins, and Karens.
The Japanese Occupation
A small group of Burmans opposed to colonial rule—including the young Aung San, who would soon become Burma’s independence hero—began to establish contact with the Japanese in 1939. They were trained by the Japanese and collaborated in the Japanese invasion of 1941, successfully ousting the British from Burmese territory by the beginning of 1942. This initial salvo of World War II in Burma set the Japanese and their predominantly Burman allies against the British and their forces made up almost entirely of Indians and Burmese ethnic minorities. One Shan commentator notes that, under these circumstances, it was impossible for the ethnic minorities to see the Burmans as a legitimate nationalist movement; instead, they were viewed as collaborators with an occupying power. (Yawnghwe 1989)
The Burmese Independence Army (BIA) that was subsequently formed by the Japanese was as ethnically imbalanced as the British military forces in Burma, but this time the shift was in favor of the Burmans. Since the Japanese occupation never effectively stretched into Chin, Kachin, or Shan territory, these ethnicities were severely under-represented. (Callahan 2004) Despite a declaration of Burma’s ‘independence’ on August 1, 1943, it did not take long for Burman nationalists to become disillusioned with their de facto role as a Japanese colony. The Japanese had begun the process of disbanding the BIA in 1942, replacing it with a new, more professionalized Burma Defense Army (BDA). It was from this group that the core of the anti-Japanese resistance would be drawn.
Despite the fresh sources of conflict that arose from the Japanese occupation, British officers and ethnic minority troops reluctantly agreed to cooperate with these new Burman belligerents in driving the Japanese out of Burma. The resistance campaign took place from 1942-45 and resulted in the British regaining control of Burma, but being immediately forced to deal with an armed, organized contingent of Burman war leaders (reconstituted before the resistance as the Burma National Army, or BNA, and known from July 1945 as the Patriotic Burmese Forces, or PBF) who were eager to gain true independence. With the expulsion of the Japanese as the most immediate goal, very little attention was paid to discussing what a future Burma would look like, in particular how and by whom it would be governed. As a consequence, the Japanese were defeated by “networks of armed guerillas and soldiers fighting against the same enemy but fighting for very different visions of the future.” (Callahan 2004)
By the end of 1946, it was clear to both the Burmese and the British that Burma would soon gain its independence. Despite emphatic warnings from Winston Churchill and others about the reckless nature of the colony’s drive towards freedom (quoted in Silverstein 1980), the British government seemed ready to work with Aung San and his party, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). The most pressing question at this time was whether or not the Frontier Areas would be associated with Ministerial Burma, and if so, in what way?
The Road to Panglong
The First Panglong conference
The famous conference of 1947 was actually the second meeting to take place at Panglong. An earlier gathering in March of 1946 brought together leaders of the Shan, Chin, Kachin and Karen in what was primarily a celebration of ethnic diversity. This meeting also had a political agenda, and discussions were held regarding the future status of the people of the Frontier Areas after independence. One of the highlights of this first conference was a proposal by H.N.C. Stevenson (the Director of the Frontier Areas) that would create a ‘United Frontier Union,’ consisting of Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni and Karen territory. (Sakhong 2003) Although the AFPFL members present spoke strongly against such an arrangement, it appears to have been relatively well received by delegates of the minority groups. Stevenson was one of several British officials who worked hard in the year leading up to independence to ensure that ethnic minority concerns were addressed both by the British administration and by the AFPFL. His forced resignation one week before the second Panglong conference removed the man who many minority leaders saw as their strongest ally; as we will see, this would prove to be very problematic for the Chin Panglong delegation in particular.
Preparations for the Second Panglong conference
The British White Paper of 1945 (a document discussing the future status of Burma) stated that no decision would be made on behalf of the people of the Frontier Areas without their consent. They were to be placed under “a special regime under the Governor until such time as their inhabitants signify their desire for some suitable form of amalgamation of their territories with Burma proper.” (Tinker 1984) Despite the frustrations of many minority groups at not having been involved in those discussions, this clause seemed to indicate that they would have to be involved in future talks regarding their status. Indeed, on February 2, 1947—only a few days before the Panglong Conference—Aung San reinforced his views supporting autonomy for the hill peoples: “As for the people of the Frontier Areas, they must decide their own future. If they wish to come in with us we will welcome them on equal terms.” (quoted in Maung Maung 1969, 188)
In actuality, Aung San went into the Panglong conference viewing it simply as an informal discussion; he was apparently not very optimistic about the results. (Tinker 1984) First of all, as will be seen in the following sections, the positions of the ethnic minority leaders were by no means consistent on the question of independence or federation with Ministerial Burma. In addition, the AFPFL was suspicious of the British and believed that regional authorities and soldiers sympathetic to the minorities were spreading dissention among the hill people in the hopes of derailing the Burman-led drive to independence. While there is evidence to suggest that British officers were discussing plans for independence with at least the Karen leaders, this does not seem to have been part of a concerted effort on the part of the British to undermine the AFPFL’s efforts at Burmese independence. Rather, it point to the relatively common colonial phenomenon of significant disconnect between local officials and officers in the colony, and the policy makers in the metropole.
The Second Panglong Conference
The second Panglong Conference was convened on February 6, 1947, with Shan and Kachin delegates initially in attendance. They agreed on several foundational principles for federating with Burma, including internal autonomy, the desire for a Kachin state, and the right to secession. They were joined on February 7 by the members of the Chin delegation, who suggested the addition of several clauses dealing with revenue sharing as well as the formation of a Supreme Executive Council of the United Hill Peoples.
Aung San and Tin Tut, representing the AFPFL, arrived on February 8 and—given the mixed signals they had been receiving—were “agreeably surprised” at the desire expressed by the three delegations to proceed with some type of union with Burma. (John Leyden, quoted in Tinker 1984) The next few days consisted of speeches, meetings, and negotiations between the various groups. It was reputedly at Panglong that Aung San made his famous promise to the hill tribes: “If Burma gets one kyat [Burmese unit of currency] then you will get one kyat.” This promise has been subsequently cited by many ethnic minority organizations in criticizing economic inequality and discrimination on the part of the Burmese government. (See, for example, the paper on Panglong by the Ethnic Nationalities Council 2007)
Finally, the Panglong Agreement was signed by all of the delegates in attendance on February 12, 1947. The British had insisted that the inhabitants of the Frontier Areas state their willingness to join a union of Burma, and Panglong had effectively satisfied that requirement. Having theoretically addressed the issue of the Frontier Areas, the AFPFL continued to organize throughout Burma for the upcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly. Tragically, Aung San was assassinated on July 19, 1947, throwing the country and the fledgling government into confusion. Rebellions by various communist factions in the months prior to independence overshadowed efforts to continue to address complaints from ethnic groups, particularly the Karen, leading to several ethnic revolts in the months following independence on January 4, 1948. Whatever spirit of unity might have existed at Panglong was already in tatters at independence and would be completely extinguished by the time of the second military coup in 1962.
The Role of Aung San
Before turning to a closer examination of the participation of different ethnic groups at Panglong, it is useful to study the role of Aung San in the conference, as well as his views on ethnicity in Burma. The standard myth of Panglong positions Aung San as possibly the only Burman figure to enjoy the trust of the ethnic minorities, and thus, the only man who could conceivably unite all of Burma. It is true that the young leader of the AFPFL went to great lengths to take his party’s message of Burmese unity to the people of the Frontier Areas, traveling to Chin and Kachin territory and to the Shan states in November and December of 1946. (Cady 1958) In speeches Aung San repeatedly stressed the need for all of the nationalities of Burma to work together in achieving independence. In his negotiations with the British he demanded the same rights for the people of the Frontier Areas as for those who lived in Ministerial Burma. (Tinker 1984) The good standing he enjoyed among many ethnic minority communities is apparent in the following comment by Saw San Po Thin, a Karen who initially fought against Aung San, then joined forces with him during the campaign against the Japanese: “He had a magnetic personality and one could not help following him.” (quoted in Maung Maung 1962, 149)
But Aung San’s legacy regarding ethnicity in Burma appears to be more mixed than his defenders choose to acknowledge. He insisted on abiding by Stalin’s famous definition of the ‘nation,’ even going so far as to suggest that only the Shan were numerous enough to warrant the label of ‘nationality.’ (Smith 1994) During his campaigns to garner support for the AFPFL, he also spent a good deal of time debating with leaders of ethnic minority groups over their future status in the union. In a letter to the KNU on March 3, 1947—less than a month after Panglong—he refused to consider ethnic quotas to address Karen concerns about representation, and also gave no guarantee on a future Karen state. (Tinker 1984) Despite his persistence in working to unite all of the ethnic groups of Burma, his position can also be viewed as paternalistic, a view that unfortunately remains common among ethnic Burmans with regard to ethnic minorities.
After the expulsion of the Japanese Aung San was justifiably concerned with the treatment that his (mostly Burman) soldiers would receive in a newly re-constituted Burmese Army that had mostly Karen in the top leadership positions. He and other leaders of the Burma National Army (BNA) suggested that the new army maintain ethnically separate units, creatively using the British notion of ‘class’ battalions in an effort to protect his troops from discrimination that was expected at the hands of British and Karen officers. (Callahan 2004) This strategy underscored the lack of trust between Burman and Karen troops, and created ethnic divides within the Burmese armed forces that would explode into violence in the months following independence.
The Ethnic Minorities’ Experiences of Panglong
Having given a brief overview of the situation leading up to Panglong and the proceedings of the conference itself, I will now address the individual experiences of each of the minority groups at Panglong, as well as those groups who were not involved. These details will help to situate Panglong within the collective histories and identities of these various groups, facilitating an understanding of how Panglong continues to function as a national myth, while also identifying some of its limitations in this respect. At the same time it is vital to stress that the histories that are presented here remain incomplete. Not only have the perspectives of many ethnic minority groups been ignored in constructing and maintaining the “official” history of Panglong, but the diversity within each of those oppositional perspectives has also been disregarded in the struggle to maintain a unified stance against government hegemony. Part of my argument in this paper is that it is necessary to recover these alternate histories in order to construct a more inclusive founding myth of modern Burma. Thus, it is important for scholars of contemporary Burmese history and politics to continue to uncover more perspectives on a formative historical event like the Panglong Conference.
The Shan at Panglong
As early as 1930 the Shan sawbwas (traditional hereditary leaders) were considering how their territory might fit into a unified Burma. In that year, a delegation of Shan leaders stated that they would be willing to join a federation with Burma, provided they were granted full autonomy. (Union of Burma 1999) Despite the relatively unified voice of the Shan leadership at that time, the war years caused considerable political upheaval in the territory. The result was conflicting messages coming from opposing groups, which prevented Shan organizations from presenting a unified position, particularly in the period following the Panglong Agreement.
While the AFPFL continued to assume a prominent role in negotiations with the British, the increasingly fragmented leadership in the Shan states was divided over the issues surrounding independence. The Shan State Freedom League (SSFL), an ally of the AFPFL, was in favor of full autonomy within a federal union but a proposal from some of the sawbwas on November 6, 1945, called for complete independence for the Shan states. (Union of Burma 1999)
Even as the future political arrangements of Burma were being decided, the Shan states were grappling with significant changes in their own governing structure. The hereditary leadership of the sawbwas was being challenged more and more, with various organizations (including the SSFL) agitating for democratic reforms. Certain members of the AFPFL recognized the need for change in political structure, but they encouraged the younger Shan to work temporarily with the traditional leadership until independence was achieved. They were promised that once that goal had been accomplished, support from the AFPFL would be forthcoming for their struggle for democratic change. (Union of Burma 1999) Although the official government story claims that the sawbwas only began to allow democratic reforms under pressure from the AFPFL in the late 1950s, it seems that during this earlier period the sawbwas had already decided to undertake certain reforms, such as popularly elected representation. (Yawnghwe 1987) Whether or not this was because the leaders recognized the value of democratic governance or because they were faced with rising opposition within their own population, the period before the second Panglong Conference was undoubtedly one of considerable political change in the Shan leadership.
In the months leading up to Panglong, the Shan leadership continued to send mixed signals. In November of 1946 they issued a resolution that indicated that they wished to become part of a federation with Ministerial Burma, provided they were granted autonomy and the right of secession, however, in January, they produced a memorandum that was not as positively inclined. (Tinker 1984) At Panglong it was clear that, unlike the Karen, many of the Shan leaders still harbored hostilities toward the British officers of the Frontier Service and were willing to join a federal union only if it meant that they would have control over their own affairs. (Tinker 1984)
Aung San had paid a visit to the Shan states in December of 1946 with the goal of enlisting their support for his upcoming negotiations with the British. Although he was supported by the SSFL, the sawbwas declined to provide him with a mandate to speak on their behalf in London. It is not clear whether this refusal was due to dissatisfaction with his position or because without every one of the sawbwas in attendance they were not authorized to do this. (Union of Burma 1999) But the Shan representatives at Panglong did eventually sign the agreement and remained mostly loyal to the Burmese government until 1959.
Shan Rebellion
Post-independence Shan nationalism had begun in the mid-1950s with the formation of small cultural student associations at the University of Rangoon. (Smith 1999) While the Shan had remained loyal to the central government throughout the first period of post-independence rebellions (1948-50) there had been significant political and military unrest in the Shan state during the 1950s. The Kuomintang (KMT) invasion in the early 1950s not only caused considerable damage in the Shan state, it also provided the central government with an excuse to increase its (often equally destructive) presence in the area. At the same time, political tensions were growing as the ten-year deadline for secession contained in the 1947 Constitution approached and passed. The uprising began with a conflict in the city of Tangyan in northern Shan State in November of 1959 and similar events continued throughout 1960.
Despite the rebellion of some of their compatriots, some Shan leaders remained loyal to the government and were at the head of the movement to re-examine the federal structure (particularly secession claims) which culminated in the Ethnic Nationalities’ Seminar, held in Rangoon in February of 1962. (Lintner 1997) Unfortunately, on March 2 of that year General Ne Win staged another coup—this time under the auspices of protecting the union from the danger posed by secessionist elements—and the Shan rebellion continued to grow.
The Kachin at Panglong
The duwas were the traditional leaders of the Kachin people of the Frontier Areas. The Kachin had been recruited and used by the British for their martial prowess and apparently were somewhat satisfied with their position under British rule. This is evident by the hostilities that were displayed between the Kachin delegates and U Nu (representing the AFPFL) at the first Panglong conference in 1946. In response to U Nu’s criticism of the British for their attempts to divide the various ethnicities of Burma (a rumor that was widely circulating in Rangoon at the time), the Kachin delegation issued a statement that strongly refuted this claim, and emphasized their skepticism at joining a union alongside the Burmese. (Lintner 1997) The statement went on to ask: “What have the Burman people done toward the hill peoples to win their faith and love?” (quoted in Silverstein 1980) These sentiments could hardly be taken as encouraging for an AFPFL leadership that was eager to resolve the question of incorporation of the Frontier Areas.
As they had with the Shan, the AFPFL turned to a younger generation of Kachin, establishing an alliance with the Kachin Youth League (KYL). For the Panglong conference, however, the AFPFL returned to working with the duwas, since the traditional leaders of the Kachin could provide the legitimacy they needed. Robert Taylor also suggests that, at a time when the AFPFL was concerned with working quickly to secure at least the appearance of unity in the struggle for independence, relying on the traditional power of the duwas was easier than muddling through the democratic processes demanded by the KYL and the SSFL. (Taylor 1982) Their delegates signed the Panglong Agreement and the Kachin also remained loyal to the central government throughout the first wave of insurgencies.
Kachin Rebellion
Although a small contingent of Kachin Rifles did defect from the Burmese Army in early 1949 to join the Karen uprising, it met with only limited support from the general population and did not trigger a more widespread rebellion among the Kachin at that time. However, political tension increased in the Kachin State throughout the 1950s, mostly as a result of the central government’s refusal to follow through on promises of infrastructure improvements and increased representation of Kachin interests at the national level. It came to a head in 1961 when Prime Minister U Nu strongly advocated a policy that endorsed Buddhism as the state religion. The mostly Christian Kachin were understandably adamantly opposed to such a measure and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) was founded on February 5 1961. Only one month later the KIO led a series of uprisings that signaled its transition into open rebellion against the government. (Smith 1999)
The Chin at Panglong
At the time of Panglong, the Chin were less politically organized than either the Shan or Karen. However, the leaders still held a conference prior to Panglong, so as to determine their position regarding independence and federation. At this meeting in November of 1946, the Chin resolved to stay under “direct control of the [British] governor,” and to support whatever stance was taken by the Shan and Kachin. (Union of Burma 1999) The Chin leaders arrived one day late to the Panglong conference to find that the Shan and Kachin delegates had already decided to federate with Ministerial Burma. Reports that describe the ease with which the Chin delegation was incorporated into the already existing agreement between the Shan and Kachin belie the shock that this development was to the Chin; however, their initial hesitance was overcome through the addition of the several previously mentioned clauses to the agreement. (Sakhong 2003)
Many commentators have interpreted the hesitation and indecision of the Chin delegation at Panglong to their inability to understand the political concepts being discussed. Letters from British officers express disbelief and frustration at the fact that on one day, Chin delegates stated that they had no need for a separate state, as long as they were granted considerable cultural and administrative autonomy, yet the next day they reversed their position and demanded a separate state! (Tinker 1984) While some of this uncertainty can be attributed to confusion over the—still rather foreign—concept of federalism, it seems that the Chin delegation was also hindered by translation difficulties.
The Chin leaders were expecting H.N.C. Stevenson to be in attendance at Panglong, as he was apparently fluent in their dialect. However, with his forced resignation one week before the conference, they had to rely on another interpreter who spoke a different dialect. According to Lian Sakhong, this disadvantage led to several significant discrepancies in the subsequent agreement. First, the Chin word ram means ‘nation-state’ or ‘country,’ but it was translated in the agreement as ‘district,’ a major difference in terms. In addition, the Chin word phunglam was translated as the limited sphere of ‘customary law’ when to the Chin it had a much broader meaning, encompassing virtually all ‘ways of life.’ (Sakhong 2003) These translation difficulties are merely one example of the circumstances that weakened the position of the minority delegates at Panglong and allowed the AFPFL to proceed with creating a Burmese nation essentially on their own terms. But in the end, it appears that the concerns of the Chin delegation at Panglong focused primarily on economic issues and that these were adequately addressed in the agreement.
Chin Rebellion
Chin nationalism did not become significantly organized as such until the mid-1960s. However, this should not be taken as evidence of widespread Chin support for the central government. The Chin Special Division (reconstituted as the Chin State in the 1974 Constitution) shares a border with the volatile Arakan State, which has been in open rebellion since before independence, and many members of nominally Arakanese resistance movements are actually ethnic Chin. (Smith 1999) In addition, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and various splinter groups organized successfully in the Chin Hills throughout the 1950s and 1960s. (Smith 1999) There was, however, no broad-based Chin ethnic rebellion against the government like those that were seen in the Shan and Kachin states.
The Karen and Panglong
The experience of the Karen at meetings leading up to Panglong and at the conference itself provides an excellent example of the seemingly intractable nature of ethnic divisions in contemporary Burma. A combination of false British promises, sustained Burman hostility toward the Karen, and the refusal of the Karen leadership to compromise when faced with the loss of British support led to the Karen rebellion which occurred immediately following independence and has continued to this day.
As explained above, the Karen were preferred by the British not only within the armed forces but also for administrative duties in the Burmese colonial state. It was during the independence struggle that members of the predominantly Burman Burma Independence Army (BIA) took the opportunity to settle old scores, thus cementing ethnic divisions that had been aggravated during the British colonial period. In a response frequently cited by researchers on Burma, one Karen leader asked: “How could anyone expect the Karen people to trust the Burmans after what happened during the war—the murder and slaughter of so many Karen people and the robbing of so many Karen villages? After all this, how could anyone seriously expect us to trust any Burman government in Rangoon?” (Saw Tha Din, quoted in Smith 1999, 62)
There were renewed calls for an independent state from the Karen leadership in September of 1945, and they had reason to believe that their British patrons would support them in this effort. (Smith 1999) Somewhat unrealistically, these declarations also stated that Karen dominated parts of Thailand should be included in the new territory. Apparently the Karen leadership felt justified in this claim since Thailand was a losing country in World War II. (Smith 1999) Then, two months later, the Karen Central Organization (KCO) declared that it would be willing to be part of a Burmese federation. At this point it was not yet apparent that the AFPFL would settle for nothing less than immediate and complete independence, so the assumption of the Karen (and of many other ethnic minorities) was that a federated Burma would remain a part of the British Commonwealth. (Smith 1999) This disagreement over the preferred status of an ‘independent’ Burma would cause many problems over the next few years.
When the Burman-led AFPFL rebelled against the Japanese in 1945, its soldiers were somewhat reluctantly accepted into the ranks of Karen, British, and other fighters who were already struggling for Burma’s independence. It is clear that those who had, by now, been involved in the anti-Japanese resistance for several years saw no reason to acknowledge the AFPFL as a legitimate nationalist movement. Rather, they were still viewed with suspicion as Japanese collaborators. (Yawnghwe 1989) Despite the temporary alliance against the Japanese, significant tensions continued to exist between the Burmans of the AFPFL and the ethnic minority groups, particularly the Karen.
British officers in Burma had, in many cases, developed close relationships with their Karen protégés and were, according to many Karen and British documents, not hesitant to assure the Karen that their loyalty and service would be recognized by the British government. Unfortunately, the men in charge of Burma policy in London were more concerned with reaching a quick settlement, and after the Japanese were defeated, the AFPFL rapidly became the dominant group in negotiations with the British.
The Karen leadership sent a ‘goodwill mission’ to England in 1946, hoping to make the case for an independent Karen state. British officials, on the other hand, either accidentally or intentionally misconstrued the purpose of this visit, believing that the question of a separate Karen state had already been decided in the negative. Religious factionalism among the Karen should not be overstated, but it seems that both the goodwill mission and the desire for an independent state were strongly supported by Christian Karen while being opposed by Buddhists. (Gravers 1996) Although documents from British officials express confusion regarding the intent of the Karen goodwill mission (Tinker 1984), Martin Smith notes that they were told explicitly that there would not be British support for an independent Karen state. (1999) It seems that by this time the British had already decided that they would stand by the AFPFL, only requiring the token declaration of minority support that the Panglong Agreement would provide.
As representatives of other ethnic minorities were preparing for negotiations with the AFPFL at Panglong, the Karen leaders were also meeting, and on February 5, 1947, the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed. Although the British insisted that the Karen had adequate representation within the governance structure of Ministerial Burma, the Karen leadership was deeply concerned with this issue and refused to involve themselves in the negotiations at Panglong. (Tinker 1984) The Karen were, admittedly, in a very difficult negotiating position, primarily because of geographic contingencies. The various ethnic groups claimed under the Karen label were split between Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas and both the British and the AFPFL insisted that they were unable to consider Burma as a whole until these two regions had been officially united. Of course, this disadvantaged the Karen, whose population would surely be misrepresented if they were forced to be recognized separately as parts of both territories.
Despite promises by the AFPFL to address the issue of a Karen state immediately following independence, the Karen were—understandably—reluctant to concede what they saw as their legitimate rights to autonomy. Their strategy was to continue to issue demands for a separate Karen state and to lobby their former British allies for support. The Karen role at Panglong remains somewhat confusing. Although several Karen delegates attended, their position was apparently only as observers. The KCO had previously threatened “non-participation” in the conference (and presumably in the subsequent government) due to their dissatisfaction with the Attlee-Aung San Agreement. (Tinker 1984) However, another document points to tensions between the ethnic minorities as a leading factor that discouraged Karen participation. According to this source, the Karen did not take part in Panglong because certain “arrangements had been made with certain sawbwas to sign the agreement.” (Tinker 1984) Whatever the reason, Karen refusal to participate in Panglong put them at a disadvantage in negotiating with the AFPFL, which by this time had assumed dominance over the political stage in Burma.
Karen Rebellion
The subsequent KNU boycott of the Constituent Assembly elections meant that there was no Karen representation independent of the AFPFL in the government. Even though all avenues to a political settlement seemed to be closed, Karen troops in the army remained loyal through independence and even played a vital role in repulsing a communist attack on Rangoon at the end of 1948. But atrocities committed by Burman army units and irregular militia units in December of 1948 pushed the Karen into open rebellion. The KNU revolted in January of 1949 and Karen militias (Karen National Defense Organizations or KNDOs) occupied several critical cities before being slowly driven back as the Burmese military regained ground.
The Mon, Arakanese, Wa and Naga: Absent From Panglong
The Mon are a people who have been territorially and (to some degree) culturally intertwined with the Burmans in central Burma for hundreds of years. They generally supported the British in their gradual takeover of Burmese territory throughout the nineteenth century and were rewarded with limited self-government and relatively more freedom than they had under Burmese domination. Early Mon associations were dedicated to preserving their distinct culture and were generally not political. Even when the United Mon Association (UMA) was formed in 1945, it worked for Burmese independence alongside the AFPFL and did not initially have separatist demands. (South 2003)
Since the conference at Panglong was specifically called to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Frontier Areas, the Mon were excluded, living primarily in what was then Ministerial Burma. Aung San and the AFPFL repeatedly stressed in speeches that they were “fully representative of the country,” and the majority of the British administration either assumed that this was a legitimate claim, or at least accepted this façade for the sake of expediency. (AFPFL statement, quoted in Silverstein 1980, 69) While this is understandable given the colonial divisions of Burma, the fact that the ethnic groups within Ministerial Burma were not participants at Panglong weakens the common subsequent claim that the conference demonstrated the will of the ethnic minorities of Burma to federate with Burma Proper.
In the months prior to independence, many Mon were beginning to build alliances with the Karen, both groups having been either excluded from or disadvantaged with regard to Panglong as a result of geographical conditions. Mon observers attended the All Karen Congress in February of 1947, where the KNU was formed days before the Panglong Agreement was signed. Having drifted away from the AFPFL by this time, the UMA also supported the KNU in its boycott of the 1947 elections to the Constituent Assembly, which meant that this body had no independent Mon representation. The final break came later in 1947, when Prime Minister U Nu rejected Mon demands for self government and the Mon Freedom League (MFL) was born, an organization that would quickly assert its right to armed insurrection. (South 2003)
Like the Mon, the Arakanese (inhabitants of the Arakan Hills region on Burma’s western border) were considered part of Ministerial Burma and were thus not invited to Panglong. Their leaders, although initially allied with the AFPFL, harbored strong doubts about the ability of the Burmans in that organization to represent their interests and splits quickly developed in the leadership. Divisions within Arakanese communities often occurred along religious lines; the Buddhists were sometimes allied with the AFPFL, while the Muslim Rohingya have repeatedly been excluded from membership in the Burmese nation-state. (Human Rights Watch 1996) As a result, Arakanese concerns were almost completely unaddressed and instability and rebellion plagued the region even before independence was achieved.
The Wa, Naga, and various other smaller ethnic groups, although resident in the Frontier Areas, were denied the right to participate at Panglong. The report of the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE)—a follow-up to Panglong which conducted interviews in March and April of 1947 to determine the best method for associating the Frontier Areas with Ministerial Burma—demonstrates the disdain which residents of the more central regions (and even sometimes, the dominant ethnic groups of the Frontier Areas) had for these groups living on the periphery. In explaining why they see no need for representation from these groups, the report cited “the primitive nature of their civilisation [sic] and the impossibility of their finding persons who will be able to assist in the drawing up of Burma's future constitution.” (quoted in Tinker 1984)
The Karenni and Panglong
The FACE report affirmed the historical independence of the Karenni people, citing their 1875 treaty between the British and Burmese governments. (cited in Tinker 1984) A visit from AFPFL leaders to the territory in April of 1946 resulted in the creation of the United Karenni Independent States Council, presumably to ascertain the desires of the Karenni people with regard to federation with Burma. (Rastorfer 1994) Although the Karenni state had been officially incorporated into Burma during the Japanese occupation, their control never effectively extended into the region.
Even though it is clear from the FACE report that the Karenni requested representation in the future Constituent Assembly without committing to a federation with Burma, the Karenni state was incorporated into the Union of Burma on August 9, 1948. There was significant dissatisfaction with this affront to their sovereignty which resulted in many Karenni joining the Karen revolt in January of 1949. (Rastorfer 1994)
Three Myths of Panglong
Having provided a more detailed history of Panglong, I will now examine three different versions of the myth held by different groups regarding this event. Both the differences and the similarities in the three myths are important in determining the significance of Panglong in ethnic group identity formation and opposition as well as its potential as a vehicle for promoting national unity. I wish to stress that these three versions of the myth are broadly attributed, and there are of course many variations within each category. However, these distinctions are analytically and comparatively useful because they map on to what are commonly seen as the three primary actors within contemporary Burmese politics: the government/military, the democratic opposition, and the ethnic minorities.
Panglong Myth #1: The Government
For the purposes of this essay I am attributing the dominant myth of Panglong (retold at the beginning of the paper) to the (predominantly Burman) government of the Burmese state, which has been the strongest force in its institutionalization. This myth highlights the unity of the ethnic groups of Burma in the struggle against the Japanese, as well as the harmonious spirit in which their representatives gathered at Panglong to sign the historic agreement. Prominent in the government myth is the adversarial role of first the Japanese, then the British, in attempting to thwart the unification of all the peoples of Burma. It was only through the peerless leadership of Aung San and the wise decisions of the leaders of the ethnic minorities that Burma was able to free itself of its colonial shackles. The government (ably assisted by the military) has struggled in the years since the agreement to protect the unity of the nation. It has had to defend the integrity of Burma against both foreign attacks on national sovereignty and against internal elements attempting to dismantle the union through separatist politics. Yet all of its actions have been in the spirit of Burmese unity, the ‘spirit of Panglong.’
Of course, this myth conveniently ignores the fact that only three of the main ethnic minority groups were in attendance at Panglong and that there was still significant dissention within those groups. The AFPFL—in an effort to fulfill its promises of achieving complete independence as quickly as possible—was willing to forego some of its more democratically inclined allies and work instead with the (significantly less democratic) traditional leaders. There was virtually no attention given to the status of minority groups within Ministerial Burma and the ethnic minorities’ utilitarian (particularly economic) reasons for signing the agreement have been glossed over in favor of the preferred nationalistic language of ‘unity’ and ‘independence.’
Panglong Myth #2: The Democratic Opposition
The second myth of Panglong, which I will be broadly attributing to the democratic opposition (dominated by the NLD) is similar in many ways to the first. It also reifies Aung San’s role in the conference and stresses the unity of the groups involved. In fact, the only significant difference between these two versions of the myth is the contrasting perspectives regarding what happened subsequent to the Panglong Conference. Whereas the first myth highlights the role of the government in protecting the unity enshrined at Panglong, the second myth names the government (and the military which controls it) as the institution that has betrayed the spirit of Panglong, beginning with the re-writing of the Constitution in 1947 in such a way as to limit the sovereignty of ethnic minorities and throw the country into civil war. (Sakhong 2003)
In this version of the myth, the ‘spirit of Panglong’ is something that needs to be recaptured and this can only be done through a recognition of the rights of the minority peoples that were agreed to on February 12, 1947. Frequently these sentiments are captured by the call for ‘another Panglong,’ a contemporary conference that will look back to the time in Burma’s history when all of the people were united and shared similar goals in working toward first, independence, and then, prosperity. (NLD policy statement 1996) Not surprisingly, this would require recognition of the results of the 1990 election which would place political power in the hands of the NLD and its allies.
This account of Panglong—while adhering more closely to historical reality than the first—is still problematic. While its criticism of government and military policies is important, it too ignores the historical tensions both between the minority groups and the AFPFL and among the minority groups themselves. Although she has repeatedly denounced the oppression of minority groups, Aung San Suu Kyi (the jailed leader of the NLD and guiding light of the democracy movement in Burma) disregards the exclusion and deception that characterized Panglong as well as the complexity of Burma’s recent ethnic history with statements such as: “We won our independence [in 1948] through the unity of the various nationalities.” (1995) The NLD myth assumes that as long as government policies can be changed, a spirit of Burmese unity will be attained. Indeed, it often insists that unity will be attained in this way, and one cannot help but be suspicious of statements like: “All the nationalities of the Union are members of the same family…They should live together in peace and harmony having permanent unity.” (NLD policy statement 1996)
Panglong Myth #3: The Ethnic Minorities
The third version of the myth of Panglong will be broadly attributed to the ethnic minorities. This account is significantly more skeptical of the actual events of Panglong, recognizing not only the ways in which the promises of Panglong were betrayed by the government, but also the limited nature of those promises to begin with. From ethnic minority accounts of Panglong we begin to get a picture of the primarily economic motives that prompted the three signatory groups to join the union. The cynical, often hostile quotes from minority leaders regarding Burmese ‘unity’ present an unapologetically honest view of the challenges of ethnic unity in a country deeply scarred by its colonial years. In fact, it is in this side of the myth that we see the truth in one British operative’s comment that minority resistance during the independence struggle against the Japanese “was based as much on hostility to the Burmese of the plains as on loyalty to the British regime.” (Charles Cruickshank, quoted in Selth 1983, 16)
At the same time, this version of the myth falls short in refusing to acknowledge the inconsistencies in the positions taken by various ethnic minority and insurgency groups. In a 2003 article Christina Fink reminded observers that “there is no unity of opinion on political strategy within minority communities” and even within groups representing minority interests, “unity has been created through coercive mechanisms: by marginalizing or removing dissenters.” (Fink 2003) Jessica Harriden explores these ‘coercive mechanisms’ in a 2002 article on the politicization of Karen identity. According to Harriden, “Karen identity as espoused by KNU leaders is singular and exclusive, with an emphasis on pan-Karen solidarity in opposition to other ethnocultural, politico-ideological, and religious movements.” (2002, 86) Because this version of Karen identity is only representative of a minority of Karen people, it ignores the diversity within its own community, thus weakening the movement overall. Harriden’s analysis can be applied to other organizations representing ethnic minorities which are often guilty of generalizations of unity and homogeneity that strongly resemble those made by the Burmese government. It is absolutely necessary that, when evaluating the myth of Panglong, ethnic minority groups recognize the presence of similarly dominating and exclusionary myths within their own histories.
Rethinking the Myth of Panglong
Despite the betrayal by the military government of most—if not all—of the key components of the 1947 Panglong Agreement (and it is crucial that we acknowledge that the 1947 Constitution and subsequent government policies have ignored and suppressed minority claims to sovereignty and self-determination), calls for a return to the ‘spirit of Panglong’ still occur and are becoming more prevalent in writings about the prospects for federalism in Burma. (see, for example, The New Panglong Initiative 2001; and Khin Maung Win 2001) This implies that, even as various ‘official’ histories continue to delude with regard to participation and motivation at the conference, the vision of ethnic and national unity that Panglong represents (or at least suggests) remains compelling.
Similarly, contemporary ethnic identity in Burma has been fundamentally shaped by the legacies of Panglong.
The initial circumstances of participation in or exclusion from the agreement played a prominent role in determining the ways in which different ethnic minority groups chose to demonstrate their opposition to the Burmese government. The three participants in the conference were all among the last to rebel, staying loyal to the government and even fighting other ethnic insurgencies as members of the armed forces. The Shan and Kachin rebellions did not begin in earnest until it became clear that the military government under Ne Win had no intention of honoring the promises made at Panglong. All those groups that were not party to Panglong rose up almost immediately following independence and despite a series of ceasefires signed throughout the 1990s, some are still engaged in active conflict with the central government. Yet, even as this essay and several others have documented the limitations of claims to Burmese unity via Panglong, the conference, the agreement, and the myth retain a strong pull on the consciousness of Burmese of every ethnicity.
In the years following the conference, ethnic minority groups (the Karen in particular) did not hesitate to express their skepticism at the shortcomings of the Panglong conference. Yet, as demands for secession fade and the reality of the Burmese nation-state becomes more entrenched, even ethnic minority voices call for a return to the ‘spirit of Panglong.’ Martin Smith notes the shift among many ethnic minority groups to a focus on inclusion in politics rather than opposition. (Smith 1999) When some of the primary opposition groups (including the Democratic Alliance of Burma and the National Coalition government of the Union of Burma) dropped their demands for independence, appeals to Panglong began appearing in their work. (see, for example, NCGUB Statement 1998)
Others have suggested that allusions to Panglong are attempts to refer to what is likely the only event in Burmese history that retains some degree of legitimacy with regard to ethnic unity. The myths of the conference, the agreement, and the vague ‘spirit’ of this event are fundamental elements of the identities of all of the ethnic groups of Burma, whether as participants or as opposition. Any discussion of national unity must acknowledge the effects that Panglong has had, and continues to have on ethnic politics in Burma.
Constructing a New History of Panglong
What are the necessary steps in approaching Panglong and its consequences in a more inclusive way? In the following section I offer five suggestions for historians and students of Burma interested in uncovering more of the complicated history of this formative event.
First and foremost, more of an effort needs to be made to gather individual and collective remembrances of Panglong and of the various meetings that occurred between and within ethnic groups both before and after the conference. Burmese history generally addresses pre-independence ethnic issues through the lens of Panglong and while it was likely the most definitive event, similar discussions and negotiations were occurring within ethnic groups at the time. It is among those groups that were not invited to Panglong (either because of their geographical location within Ministerial Burma or because the participants considered their input inconsequential) that the most historical research needs to be conducted. At the same time, Burmese people—particularly ethnic Burmans—must acknowledge the necessity of multiple historical perspectives on an important event such as the Panglong Conference. If these is to be any hope that a collective Burmese history will be an effective tool for ending ethnic conflict and building a Burmese nation, that history must be more inclusive and must acknowledge the destructive effects that the myth of Panglong has had on ethnic unity.
Second, a reappraisal of Panglong must also recognize the limited nature of the promises that were part of the agreement. Although Aung San made significant concessions to the minority leaders, such as granting full autonomy in internal affairs, the negotiations did not take place with all the parties on equal footing. The motivations for participation varied among the ethnic minority signatories, yet economic concerns were of primary importance. Recognition of this fact is necessary in breaking though false claims of “ethnic unity” that are attributed to Panglong.
Third, the complicated and often contradictory roles of the participants in the conference need to be critically examined. I recognize that in the case of Aung San this is a particularly difficult task due to the near-mythical status he has assumed as the “father” of modern Burma. In this paper I have given a very brief account of his complex views and actions with regard to ethnicity and the Burmese nation, but this topic must be addressed in far more detail. The positions of the ethnic minority leaders at Panglong must also be reviewed, as well as the dynamics that led the AFPFL to work mainly with traditional leaders at Panglong, disregarding their more democratically inclined allies.
Fourth, scholars must engage in a critical study of the formation of hegemonic identities among ethnic minority groups. Works by Jessica Harriden and Christina Fink are notable in this regard but for the most part this difficult and complex aspect of the history of ethnic conflict in Burma remains untouched. Granted, the illusion of unity and solidarity is often vital when a group is engaged in a struggle for survival against a more powerful enemy (as most ethnic minority opposition groups have been against the Burmese government for the past forty to fifty years), but the reappraisal of founding myths must occur at every level of this conflict. Recognizing exclusion can be a painful process but it is absolutely necessary in order to redress the wrongs of the past and create a more inclusive community for the future.
Finally, all of the people within the borders of the Burmese state (and the many who have been exiled both voluntarily and involuntarily) must engage with the difficult question: What does it mean to speak of the Burmese nation? Who is included or excluded form this entity? Ethnic conflict exists in every society and its visible presence often depends less on the existence of true ethnic harmony and more on the ability of a dominant central power to impose a hegemonic identity. While the space for critical discussion remains severely limited within Burma itself, it will be necessary for the Burmese people to collectively discover a meaningful foundation for a national community, a task that seems monumental in a country whose very name remains contested to this day.
Conclusion
History, and the collective memory on which history is founded, are constructed concepts. National myths are not unchanging entities; even dominant, hegemonic narratives of a nation are contested and reshaped, sometimes subtly, sometimes drastically. Can we engage in a collective reappraisal of Panglong, constructing an “alternative history which emphasizes the dynamic, multiple, and contested nature of historical identities?” (Duara 1995, 16)
Burma (and indeed, any multi-ethnic nation) faces the dilemma of attempting to build national unity on a myth that is perceived in drastically different (often exclusionary) ways by the different groups it seeks to incorporate. In this essay I have attempted to present a history of Panglong that goes beyond the official account, and to identify the different ways the conference and its effects are mythologized by the various conflicting groups in Burma. As a national myth, Panglong is crucial to deciphering the persistent ethnic conflict that has plagued Burma since independence, but we must also seek out ways to reinterpret this ‘common history’ in a way that recognizes ethnic diversity.
Is it possible to acknowledge a nationalist founding mythology that is basic enough to be effective in inspiring loyalty to the nation while simultaneously being flexible enough to allow individuals and groups the freedom to respond to, contest, and reshape those myths when necessary? The Panglong Conference is the event that came closest to embodying ethnic unity in Burma, but calls for a return to the ‘spirit of Panglong’ will remain ineffective unless the event and its consequences are understood. The honest appraisal of modern Burma’s founding myth will be a necessary step in the struggle to build national unity.
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